Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Multi-valued logic: a logic that assumes more than the two classical truth values true and false. There are trivalent logics with possibility or indeterminacy as a third value. For tetravalent logics there are e.g. ¼ or ¾ as additional values that introduce a gradation in the rating. In the case of infinite-valued logics, the truth values can be interpreted as probability values._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
Hartry Field on Multi-valued Logic - Dictionary of Arguments
II 144 Three-valued logic/Kleene/Field: Def correct/Kleene: an assertion is correct only if it has the highest of the three truth values. >Correctness. Field: Problem: not all of Tarski’s biconditionals remain correct. Even e.g. "If A, then A" is not generally assertible. Therefore, the Kleene logic is weak. >Stronger/weaker. "If A then A" is not generally assertible -> Restall: "n-fold jump" ... + ... II 145 Material conditional/Three-valued logic/Kleene/Field: the materal conditional is a conditional that has one of the two highest truth values. So the Curry paradox is impossible: "If this statement is true, then p". >Material conditional, >Curry paradox._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |